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Abstract 
 
We test for efficiency in the market for Swedish co-ops by examining the negative relationship 
between the sales price and the present value of future rents. If the co-op housing market is 
efficient, the present value of co-op rental payments due to underlying debt obligations of the 
cooperative should be fully reflected in the sales price. However, we find that, on average, a one 
hundred kronor increase in the present value of future rents only leads to a 45 to 65 kronor 
reduction in the sales price; co-ops with higher rents are thus relatively overpriced compared to 
those with lower rents.  Our analysis indicates that pricing tends to be more efficient in areas 
with higher educated and wealthier buyers. By relying on cross-sectional relationships in the 
data, our results are less sensitive to transaction costs and other frictions than time-series tests of 
housing market efficiency.   
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I. Introduction 
 For the majority of households, the purchase of a home is the largest financial decision of 
their lives. One may therefore assume that housing market transactions are conducted by agents 
who have carefully evaluated all available information and that the resulting prices reflect that 
information. However, there are fewer professional investors in a housing market than in a 
typical financial market, which may lead to less informationally efficient prices if the average 
home buyer cannot fully process all available information. In addition, high transaction costs and 
other market frictions, such as transfer taxes and inherent inertia in the market, may also prevent 
people from timing the market or otherwise making full use of their information. This last point 
makes traditional time-series tests of housing market efficiency difficult to interpret (e.g. Case 
and Shiller 1989, 1990).1, 2 
 In this paper, we present a simple test of efficiency in the market for cooperative housing 
in Sweden. Cooperatives are distinct from condominiums in that the purchaser of a unit in a 
cooperative housing association is formally buying a share in the cooperative, along with the 
non-time-restricted right to occupy the unit, i.e. the actual apartment.  As is typical for 
condominiums, owners of a co-op unit must also pay a monthly rent. The rent is comprised of 
maintenance fees and the capital costs attributed to the cooperative’s debt.  The latter derives 
from the fact that the formal owner of a co-op unit is the cooperative association; the cooperative 
can have its own debts, which are serviced through the collection of rents from the members of 
the cooperative, i.e. the indirect owners of the cooperative apartments. These implicit interest 
                                                 
1 Meese and Wallace (1994) try to get around the issue of market frictions by considering tests of efficiency in the 
long-run, where short-run market frictions should play no role. However, their approach is essentially based on 
comparisons between price and rent indices, which for obvious reasons are not based on the same housing units or 
units that necessarily have comparable characteristics. 
2 Other related studies include Case and Quigley (1991), Guntermann and Norrbin (1991), Gatzlaff (1994), Berg and 
Lyhagen (1998), Englund et al. (1999), Hill et al. (1999), Malpezzi (1999), Hwang and Quigley (2002, 2004), Gallin 
(2005), and Rosenthal (1999). 
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payments in the monthly co-op rents are on top of any direct mortgage service obligations that 
the home buyer may have incurred.  Thus, only part of the true cost of owning a co-op unit is 
reflected in the actual sales price; the remaining cost is reflected in the monthly rent. The total 
value of a co-op unit can therefore be expressed as the sum of its sales price and the discounted 
value of the cooperative financing component of the monthly rent payments, i.e. rent excluding 
the maintenance fee component. 
This simple present value relationship provides the starting point for our analysis. In 
particular, if markets are efficient, there should be an inverse one-to-one relationship between 
prices and discounted rents. That is, if the present value of rents goes up by one unit, prices 
should decrease by one unit. This relationship should hold for any co-op being sold.  For 
instance, consider two otherwise identical co-ops, one with a monthly rent of 2,000 Swedish 
Kronor (SEK) and the other with a monthly rent of 3,500 SEK.  This implies a difference of 
18,000 SEK in annual rent payments. Assuming an effective discount rate of 5 percent, the 
present value of the difference in future rent payments is 360,000 SEK.  Thus, the apartment 
with the lower rent should have a 360,000 SEK higher sales price.3   
Thus, using transaction-level data of individual co-op sales, we can test for market 
efficiency in the cross-section rather than the time-series dimension, thereby avoiding most of 
the difficulties caused by market frictions and inertia. Of course, by relying on a cross-section of 
transactions, we need to control for the individual characteristics of the transacted co-ops. We do 
so by using a rich data set that includes more than 30,000 transactions of Swedish co-ops from 
2002 to 2005.  
                                                 
3 Rent payments such as these are realistic for an apartment of approximately 70 square meters, which on average 
sells for 1.2 million SEK in our sample. 
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Using data from the Swedish market provides several potential benefits. First, co-op 
transaction costs in Sweden are very low.  Second, co-op ownership is the only way to own an 
apartment in Sweden. Thus, the Swedish co-op market is likely to be more representative of the 
overall owner-occupied housing market than it may be in the U.S., where co-ops are rare except 
in certain cities (Schill et al., 2004).  Third, strict building codes and a narrow income 
distribution make Swedish apartments very homogeneous. This makes it much easier to control 
for unobservable characteristics in the data. 
Our empirical analysis is based on hedonic price regressions that relate co-op sales prices 
to future discounted rent payments.  The discounted value of the rent takes into account 
Sweden’s 30 percent tax deduction on mortgage interest payments and is computed using the 
five-year mortgage rate on the date of the transaction. In our preferred specification, we control 
for (i) apartment characteristics, e.g. size and the number of rooms, (ii) location, through the use 
of parish and neighborhood fixed effects, and (iii) national and local housing market trends.4 
If markets were efficient, then the regression coefficient on future discounted rent 
payments should equal minus one, fully reflecting the cost of a higher rent in the sales price. 
However, the empirical results show that an increase in discounted rents by 100 SEK only leads 
to a decrease in price of about 45 SEK. On average, co-ops with high rents are thus relatively 
over-priced.  We consider the sensitivity of this baseline finding to changes in our assumptions 
about the amortization rate, future interest rates, and capital gains. For example, specifications 
which allow the cooperative to amortize its loans at a 1 percent annual rate yield a coefficient on 
discounted rent of -0.64; this is still far from efficient.  Additional sensitivity analyses also 
indicate that there is little variation in these results over the sample period, and that they are not 
                                                 
4 Linneman (1986) also relies on hedonic price regressions to determine what the ‘fair’ value of houses are and 
classifies the market as inefficient if the pricing errors based on the fitted hedonic regression exceed the transaction 
costs in the market for a substantial number of observations.  
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being driven by the relatively low interest rates that prevailed during the last few quarters of our 
sample. 
The only way to reconcile prices and rents, as predicted by the efficient market 
hypothesis, is for buyers to have extremely risk-averse beliefs of the future path of the interest 
rate while assuming that rents will stay almost fixed. This explanation is unlikely to be 
convincing both because of the very high implicitly needed future interest rates and because rents 
in general also go up if interest rates rise, since the rents themselves reflect debt service 
payments on loans. It is thus hard to reconcile the empirical findings with an efficient market.5  
Finally, we also analyze whether these empirical results are consistent across the 
population of home buyers. Specifically, we estimate the hedonic pricing model for each parish 
separately. Interestingly, we find strong evidence that the degree of market efficiency varies 
between parishes and that it does so in a manner that is systematically related to socio-economic 
variables. On average, parishes with the highest degree of market efficiency are also those with 
the highest proportion of university educated inhabitants and the highest incomes and wealth; 
however, for most parishes, the null of market efficiency can still be rejected. These findings also 
line up well with one’s intuition regarding who would be the ‘sophisticated’ buyer. 
Our findings are in line with most of the time-series results reported in the literature, 
which typically show that house prices do not follow random walks and that there may be profit 
opportunities for buyers who time the market (e.g. Case and Shiller, 1989, 1990). However, our 
results are less sensitive to transaction costs and thus provide much stronger evidence against 
fully efficient prices in housing markets than those previously presented. 
                                                 
5 The five year fixed-rate mortgage interest rate that we use should be a conservative (high) estimate of the discount 
rate facing the home buyer at the time of the purchase, given that most home buyers in Sweden take at least a part of 
their loans with a floating rate. For instance, according to the mortgage lender SBAB’s website (www.sbab.se), less 
than 10 percent of their loans have interest rates that are fixed for five or more years; in fact, 69 percent of their 
loans have floating rates; these statistics are for July 2006. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the characteristics of the 
Swedish co-op housing market and Section III outlines the econometric model and discusses the 
potential identification issue of omitted variables. Section IV describes the data. The main 
empirical results are presented in Section V and Section VI analyzes the sensitivity of our results 
to assumptions about rents, discount rates, and amortization. Section VII explores whether our 
findings of inefficiency are heterogeneous across parishes and socioeconomic characteristics.  
Section VIII concludes and discusses potential policy applications. 
 
II. The Swedish Cooperative Market 
Overview 
Cooperative (co-op) ownership is the only way to own an apartment in Sweden; 
condominiums do not exist as an alternative. Apart from single family houses, co-ops are 
therefore the only other form of owner-occupied housing, and in central areas of most cities, the 
only alternative to rental apartments. The purchase of a co-op unit entails ownership of a share of 
the cooperative, as well as membership in the cooperative association. The share ownership is 
not time-restricted in any sense, and will only be returned to the cooperative in the rare cases 
when an owner must sell and cannot find a buyer. In contrast to the condominium form of 
ownership, a share in a co-op does not convey actual property rights over the apartment unit, and 
purchases of co-op apartments are not formally regarded as real estate transactions. In practice, 
the main implications are that co-ops have less value as collateral and, in the unlikely event that 
the cooperative goes bankrupt, the share-holders would lose their rights to the apartments. The 
shareholders in the co-op are, however, free to renovate and otherwise modify their apartments in 
the same manner as an owner of a condominium would be.  
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Formally, a new owner of a share in a co-op needs to be approved by the co-op board, but 
this is primarily a formality and rejections tend to be rare. However, the co-op board in Sweden 
does commonly exercise its powers with regards to renting out co-ops to a third party. As a 
general rule, co-ops are intended to be occupied by their actual owners and cannot be rented out 
without board approval. There are some time limited exceptions, such as studying or working 
abroad for a fixed period of time, but it is usually difficult to get permission for more than a few 
years. The motivation behind these rules is that the co-op is not intended as an investment 
vehicle but as an owner-occupied form of living. From the perspective of the current study, this 
means that although there will always be some speculators in the market, e.g. co-ops can always 
be rented out without board approval, the vast majority of observations in the data represent 
purchases by people intent on occupying the unit themselves.6 
 
Rent Determination 
The cooperative association faces two sorts of costs. First, there are the costs of 
maintaining all interior and exterior common areas as well as other maintenance costs that may 
be shared among the members, such as water and heat, which may be included in the rent 
because of district heating. Second, the cooperative as a whole may have loans that need to be 
serviced. These costs are met by collecting rents from the association members; the rents are 
based on the size of their shares in the cooperative and typically are fairly linear functions of 
apartment size. The per square meter maintenance fee component of the rent generally does not 
vary much between different co-op associations, but the mortgage portion can vary substantially 
depending on the size of the cooperatives’ loans.  
                                                 
6 Turner (1997) provides some additional information on the cooperative housing market in Sweden. 
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When a co-op is initially formed and the shares are sold, either by a residential developer 
or through a conversion of rental units to co-op units, the founders can decide how much of the 
total cost of the shares will be paid upfront by the buyers and how much of it will be financed by 
mortgages taken out by the cooperative itself. If the cooperative opts to finance a larger amount, 
then higher monthly rents are necessary. Ceteris paribus, higher rents should therefore imply a 
lower price.7 
It should be stressed that given the size of an apartment’s share in the cooperative, the 
rent will not be affected by individual characteristics of the apartment. That is, if an apartment 
gets renovated by the current owner, the increased standard of the apartment will only be 
reflected in the price of the apartment when it is next sold, not in its rent.8  
 
Market Characteristics 
In contrast to the U.S. housing market, the Swedish housing market is generally 
characterized by low transaction costs and few market frictions; this is particularly true for the 
co-op market. A purchaser of a co-op in Sweden faces virtually no transaction costs: there are no 
transfer fees or taxes and no fees for a formal title to the apartment; the realtor fees are paid by 
the seller; and there are minimal fees to obtain a mortgage (less than 1500 SEK). Overall, 
frictions in the market are also small. For instance, sales contingent on the seller finding a new 
                                                 
7 It is not clear what determines the proportions in this initial split between the upfront cost and the financing 
through cooperative loans that are paid for through future rents. Indeed, given that the cooperative generally enjoys 
less advantageous tax deductions on its loans, it would typically be more efficient for the individual buyers to pay 
the total value of the co-op unit directly and carry all of the capital costs in the form of private mortgages. We 
briefly return to this puzzle in the conclusions.     
8At times, the cooperative as a whole conducts major renovations, such as changing the electricity or sewage 
systems in the entire building. Anticipated rent increases associated with such renovations could bias our results if 
the buyers of a certain co-op perceive the long-run rent as higher than what we observe. Cooperatives, however, do 
typically have funds put aside over time to at least partially cover the costs of future renovations; thus, many 
anticipated renovations should cause only minor, and most likely transient, changes in rents. Unanticipated 
renovations that lead to increases in the rents cause no bias, of course.    
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residence, which is common in the U.S. and U.K. housing markets, are non-existent. Given the 
the legal culture in Sweden, the amount of paperwork involved is also minimal and generally 
based on standard contracts that cannot be altered. The seller does incur some transaction costs in 
the form of a realtor’s commission and potential capital gains taxes, unless the revenue from the 
sale is used to purchase a new residence. However, from the perspective of the current study, 
where the focus of interest is on efficient price formation in the cross-section, rather than across 
time, the potential transaction costs faced by the seller should not affect the results. 
In summary, the Swedish co-op market suffers from few transaction barriers, both in 
absolute terms and relative to many other housing markets. There is thus great potential for this 
market to function in an efficient manner. However, unlike a frictionless financial market, there 
is a dearth of professional investors operating on the market, which may affect price setting in 
the market, a point to which we return later. 
 
III. Modeling the Relationship between Prices and Rents 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the degree to which differing rents across 
apartments are accounted for in the sales prices of co-ops. The basic idea is that given two 
identical apartments with different rents, the difference in price between the two apartments 
should equal the difference between the present values of all future rent payments. To account 
for the fact that apartments differ in dimensions other than rents, we rely on hedonic price 
regressions and control for a variety of apartment characteristics. 
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Theoretical Motivation 
As discussed previously, the rent on a co-op is comprised of a maintenance fee 
component and a capital cost component, which covers the cooperatives’ financial costs in terms 
of mortgages and loans.  In effect, a co-op purchaser takes on a share of the cooperatives’ debt 
obligations, commensurate with the size of his share in the cooperative. Thus, the true price, or 
intrinsic value, of the co-op is actually the sum of the sales price and the present value of this 
future stream of capital cost payments.  Consequently, the sales price should equal the intrinsic 
value less the present value of the capital cost payments. 
In a hedonic pricing formula, this relationship would be captured as follows, 
 ( )PVi i i ip C Xθ β ε= + +  (1) 
with 1θ = − . Here, ip  is the sales price, Ci is the capital cost component of the rent, the vector Xi 
includes other relevant characteristics of the co-op, and εi is the error term; PV denotes present 
value.  
 
Empirical Implementation 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to test whether the coefficient θ in equation (1) is 
significantly different from negative one. To bring this hedonic pricing formula to the data, we 
must deal with the fact that the capital cost component of the rent is not directly observed.  
Rather, we only observe the total rent, i.e. maintenance plus capital costs.  So, in order to justify 
the use of total rent rather than the capital cost component, we make two fairly weak 
assumptions. Specifically, we assume that the utility or value of the services rendered to the co-
op owner from the maintenance fee does not vary between co-ops and that the maintenance fee 
per square meter is equal across cooperatives.  That is, we assume that the maintenance part of 
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the rent provides the basic services needed to maintain the buildings, but adds no additional 
utility above this base level.  This is a fairly weak assumption given the nature of most Swedish 
housing cooperatives.  There are typically no common area rooms or other elements, such as 
pools or doormen, which would add to the maintenance fee but at the same time provide 
additional utility to the home-owners.9  Under these two assumptions and a common discount 
rate for all buyers, it follows that the difference between the present value of the total rent and 
the present value of the capital cost component is constant across co-op transactions once size is 
controlled for; hence, θ  can be consistently estimated.  As our data set spans nearly four years, 
the discount rate is not identical for all transactions; therefore, we also include the discount rate 
itself as a control variable. 
We calculate the present value of future discounted rents as i iRent k , where ki is the 
discount rate given by  
 ( )1i i i ik m aτ π= − + −  (2) 
and τ is the tax rate at which mortgage payments are deductible and equal to 30 percent, mi is the 
mortgage rate at the time of transaction i, ai is the amortization rate, and πi is the expected capital 
gains on the apartment.10 
 Equation (3) presents the basic specification taken to the transaction-level data. The 
dependent variable, p, is the sales price for transaction i in quarter t, parish j and zip code k.   
                                                 
9Even if the second assumption does not hold, the pricing relationship with θ  = - 1 should still be true as long as the 
first assumption holds. However, this would capture a somewhat broader relationship between prices and rents; that 
is, as long as higher rents do not provide higher utility, the differences in rents should be fully reflected in the sales 
prices.  
10 The maintenance fee part of the rent is likely to increase somewhat over time as the cost of maintenance increases 
in nominal terms. However, this does not affect the future discounted value of the capital cost component; inflation 
should therefore not be included in the discount factor. 
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 ( )*itjkitjk itjk t t j j j t j k k itjk
i
rent
p X Q P P T Z
k
θ β γ δ λ ϖ ε⎛ ⎞= + + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (3) 
To consistently estimate the relationship between the price of an apartment and the 
present discounted value of its rent (θ ), one must control for all characteristics which are 
correlated with both rent and price.  We directly control for a number of observable and 
unobservable characteristics. Specifically, we control for apartment characteristics, such as size, 
number of rooms, floor, building age, and whether or not heat is included in the rent, as well as 
the mortgage rate facing the purchaser (X). We also control for unobservable geographical or 
neighborhood characteristics, using parish and zip code fixed effects (P and Z), as well as trends 
in prices and rents using quarterly dummies (Q) and parish specific time trends (P*T). In 
Sweden, a parish is comparable to a county; zip codes are quite small, ranging from a few 
hundred to a few thousand residents.   
 
Omitted Variables 
 Of course, given the cross-sectional nature of our analysis, one must address the concern 
of omitted variable bias. If a variable that is correlated with both prices and rents is not included 
in our specification, our estimate of the rent coefficient would be biased. In particular, an omitted 
variable that is positively correlated with both price and rents would bias our results away from 
market efficiency and towards a coefficient of zero. 
The most obvious omission is probably a measure of the overall standard of the 
apartment. However, there is no strong reason to believe that rents and standard are correlated.  
In fact, a review of co-op advertisements provides little evidence in support of such a 
relationship. Specifically, idiosyncratic upgrades, such as a kitchen renovation, would be 
reflected in the price of an apartment but not in the rent. Not all variation in standard is 
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idiosyncratic across units.  It is certainly feasible that some cooperatives with an overall greater 
standard have a higher level of debt. To the extent that age and standard are correlated, however, 
we can indirectly control for systematic variation in standard by including building age in our 
analysis.  We should also stress that strict building codes in conjunction with thin tails in the 
income distribution contribute to fairly homogeneous housing standards in Sweden. Indeed, it is 
no stretch to say that there are no ‘bad’ apartments in Sweden. Omitting information about an 
apartment’s level of standard should thus be less crucial here than in many other housing 
markets.  
 Other omitted variables are more subtle. For instance, many rental buildings have been 
converted into cooperatives in recent years; this occurs through a process where the tenants in 
the rental units buy the building and form a cooperative. If some tenants elect not to buy their 
apartments, those units remain as rental units owned by the cooperative. The cooperative 
typically plans to sell these apartments as co-ops once the current tenants give up their rental 
contracts. Such sales can provide the cooperative with large one-time profits that may be used to 
pay off their debts and lower rents. Not controlling for future sales could bias the results away 
from efficiency since expected long-term capital costs of the cooperative may be smaller than 
what we infer from the current rent level.11  
Since our data does not indicate whether a cooperative has rental apartments remaining, 
we obtain additional information from annual statements for a subset of 125 cooperatives in 
                                                 
11Another potential omitted ‘variable’ is that high rents, and consequently large debt levels, might in some 
circumstances send a signal that the cooperative is poorly managed or in some economic distress. If high rents were 
indeed a signal of economic problems for the cooperatives, one would expect low rent apartments to be relatively 
more attractive than high rent apartments; that is, the coefficient in front of the discounted rent, θ, should be less 
than minus one in an efficient market. Given that we consistently find θ to be greater than minus one in the 
empirical results, we do not investigate this conjecture further. However, it potentially adds to the strength with 
which we reject the efficient market hypothesis. 
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Göteborg.12 We find that a number of the newer cooperatives do own rental units and that there 
are instances where sales of these units lead to a substantial amortization of their loans.  Overall, 
15 of the 125 cooperatives amortized more than 5 percent of their loans; in eight of those cases, 
it was explicitly stated that apartments had been sold. Yet, only three of those 15 cooperatives 
lowered their rents as a consequence. Indeed, many new cooperatives, which are the ones that 
tend to have rental units left to sell, often seem to face fairly large renovation costs, which at 
least partially offset the gains from their sales of rentals.13  
As an attempt to control for such omitted variables, we also estimate equation (4), which 
aggregates the data up to the parish-level for each quarter.   
 ( ) ( )PV *tj tj tj t t j j j t j tjp rent X Q P P Tθ β γ δ λ ε= + + + + +  (4) 
We include the same set of observable controls, measured as the parish average for each quarter, 
as well as parish dummies and parish-specific time trends. Averaging the data in this way washes 
out most of the idiosyncratic differences across apartments.  Thus, while we still cannot control 
directly for apartment standard, for instance, the unobservable of concern is now average 
standard across parishes. As it is highly unlikely that average parish standard changes during the 
four years of our data, this unobservable standard will be wiped out with parish fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
12 The annual statements were obtained from the website of the realtor firm Ahre, www.ahre.se. Most of the 
statements cover either the year 2004 or 2005. In cases where there were multiple years available for one 
cooperative, we recorded the results from the most recent statement. 
13 In addition, we merge information from the annual statements into our transaction data; this leaves us with a data 
set of more than 900 observations. Actually controlling for whether the apartment is from a co-operative with any 
rental units left to sell has no effect on the estimated discounted rent coefficient.  This sub-sample is fairly 
representative, as the estimated rent coefficient is quite comparable to that found when using the entire sample. 
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IV. Data 
We obtain data on over 30,000 transactions of Swedish co-ops between January 2002 and 
September 2005 for the three largest cities in Sweden: Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö. The 
data come from a company called Värderingsdata AB, which collects data on all co-op 
transactions conducted by members of Svenska Mäklarsamfundet (the Swedish realtor 
association), as well as by Föreningssparbankens Fastighetsbyrå and Svensk 
Fastighetsförmedling, which are the two largest realtors on the market. The data is believed to 
cover approximately 70 percent of all co-op transactions that occur in Sweden. 
There are no indications that the data are not representative of co-op transactions in 
Sweden. The only obvious selection bias is a truncation of the very high end of the market. This 
is probably most relevant for Stockholm’s wealthiest neighborhoods, where the co-op market is 
dominated by a handful of realtors dealing almost exclusively in high-end properties. However, 
unless one is primarily interested in price formation at the most expensive end of the market, 
these omissions are not likely to affect the results and generalizability of our study. 
For each transaction, the following data are recorded: the transaction date, the actual sales 
price, the monthly rent, the size of the apartment measured in square meters, the number of 
rooms, the apartment’s floor number, the build year, and whether heating is included in the 
rent.14  In addition, the address of the apartment, including the zip code, and the name of the co-
op in which it is sold are reported.  The zip code allows us to identify in which parish and city 
the apartment is located.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample.  The average price of co-ops 
sold in the entire sample is 1,250,685 SEK; at an exchange rate of 7.5 SEK per U.S. dollar, this 
                                                 
14 In Sweden, ‘number of rooms’ refers to the number of rooms besides the kitchen and bathroom.  So, a one-room 
apartment is a studio, a two-room apartment is a one bedroom, etc.  Number of bathrooms is not reported in the data; 
but, this is largely a reflection of the lack of emphasis placed on bathrooms in the market. 
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is approximately $167,000.  Prices vary substantially across the three cities, ranging from an 
average of 1.6 million SEK in Stockholm to 1.0 million SEK in Göteborg and just 0.7 million 
SEK in Malmö.  The average annual rent is 37,629 SEK across all cities; there is much less 
variation in the annual rent across cities than there is in the price.  To calculate the present value 
of future rent payments, we rely on the mortgage rate as of the transaction date. This is measured 
as the average of the five-year rates from three different lenders (SBAB, Nordea, and 
Stadshypotek); the average mortgage rate faced by purchasers in our sample is 4.8 percent.  
Assuming no capital depreciation and no amortizations, but allowing for tax deductions, the 
average present discounted value of annual rent payments is 1,150,926 SEK.  Thus, the present 
value of future rent payments is not an inconsequential amount; on average, it almost equals the 
purchase price.  Though we do not directly have data on the size of the capital component of the 
rent, we estimate it by subtracting out 350 SEK per square meter from the annual rent, which is a 
reasonable estimate of the maintenance fee. The average discounted value of the capital 
component of the rent is 448,351 SEK, which is still almost 40 percent of the average sales price. 
Figure 1 plots average transaction price and average discounted annual rent, both with 
and without maintenance costs, for each quarter from January 2002 through September 2005.  
Substantial increases are seen in each data series.  Average transaction prices increased more 
than 35 percent over this time period while average discounted rent streams actually increased by 
more than 80 percent.  However, the increase in the discounted annual rent can be attributed to 
changing discount rates, which decreased from 6.7 percent in the first quarter of our study to 3.6 
percent, on average, in the final quarter. 
The average apartment in the entire sample is 66 square meters (approximately 700 
square feet); two room apartments are the most common.  Overall, 73 percent of the co-ops 
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include heat in the rent.  Seven mutually exclusive variables are created to indicate the age of an 
apartment, where the age is defined to be the transaction year minus the build year.  Overall, 5.2 
percent of the units are less than 10 years old.  About two-thirds of the units, however, are more 
than 50 years old. Note that the age of the building and the age of the cooperative are generally 
not the same; however, we lack data on the year in which the cooperative was founded.  
 
V. Baseline Results 
 In this section, we present results when the discount factor is set equal to (1-τ)mi, where 
mi is the five year mortgage rate as defined above. The amortization rate and expected 
appreciation rate are both set to zero. In the subsequent analyses, we explore different 
modifications to this baseline discount factor. 
 
Transaction – Level Analysis 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (3). The coefficient on the discounted 
annual rent is displayed in the first row.  A coefficient significantly different than -1.0 provides 
evidence of market inefficiency in the sense that co-op purchasers do not properly discount the 
rent.  For instance, if the rent coefficient is equal to -0.5, then for every 100 SEK increase in 
discounted rent, the transaction price only decreases by 50 SEK. Column (1) in Table 2 shows 
the result from simply regressing transaction price on discounted annual rent; this yields a rent 
coefficient that is actually positive (0.38) and significant; this is not surprising given that larger 
apartments have greater shares of the cooperative and, consequently, higher rents.  As seen in 
column (2), including a second-order polynomial of apartment size yields a negative relationship 
between discounted annual rent and transaction price. 
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To account for the fact that prices and discounted rents have been trending upwards over 
the course of the sample period, column (3) includes a set of quarter dummies; this brings the 
rent coefficient to -0.75.  Column (4) adds parish dummies to control for unobservable 
community or geographical characteristics that are fixed within a parish.15 To control for varying 
price trends across regions, column (5) includes parish-specific linear time trends.  Controlling 
for both unobservable fixed parish characteristics and parish-specific trends yields a rent 
coefficient of -0.51.  Column (6) of Table 2 controls for apartment specific characteristics, such 
as number of rooms, floor, whether heat is included in the rent, and age.  Though the estimated 
coefficients for the apartment characteristic variables are themselves highly significant, there is 
no change in the rent coefficient.  Similarly, controlling for the discount rate faced by the 
purchaser in column (7) yields little change in the estimated rent coefficient. Lastly, column (8) 
adds zip code fixed effects into the specification to capture unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics.   
When the full set of controls is included, the estimated coefficient on the discounted 
annual rent is -0.45.  As the standard error is just 0.02, the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
rent coefficient is from -0.49 to -0.41.16  On average, increasing the discounted annual rent by 
100 SEK decreases the transaction price by only 45 SEK.  Thus, the results so far strongly reject 
the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
15 Table 1 presents within parish standard deviations for each of the variables; i.e. the standard deviation after 
subtracting the parish mean from each observation. While there is slightly less variation within parishes than in the 
entire sample, there is still a sufficient amount of variation for identification. Similarly, though not presented here, a 
substantial amount of variation remains when looking at the within zip code standard deviations for each variable. 
16 Throughout the paper, all transaction-level analyses use robust standard errors that are clustered at the parish-
level. 
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Parish – Level Analysis 
 The transaction-level analysis presented above estimates the relationship between 
discounted rent and price while controlling for observable apartment characteristics as well as 
unobservable neighborhood and community characteristics.  In an attempt to deal with potential 
omitted variable bias, Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (4), which aggregates 
the data up to the parish-level for each quarter.  The full set of observable controls seen in Table 
2 as well as quarterly dummies, parish fixed effects, and parish specific time trends are included 
in the parish-level estimation. 
 Once again, column (1) of Table 3 includes no controls and results in a discounted annual 
rent coefficient of -0.28; by averaging the observations in each parish, apartment size is at least 
partially controlled for.  The remaining columns of Table 3 add in the controls in a manner 
parallel to that presented in Table 2.  When the full set of controls is included in column (7), the 
estimated coefficient on the discounted annual rent is -0.62.  Standard errors are somewhat larger 
here than in the transaction-level analysis, yielding a 95 percent confidence interval of -0.74 to -
0.50.  Overall, the transaction and parish-level analyses tell similar stories.  Thus, given that this 
aggregation results in a large decrease in sample size and, consequently, precision as well as an 
inability to control for zip code characteristics, we only present transaction-level results for the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
VI. Robustness – Relaxing the Discount Rate Assumptions 
 The empirical results presented in the previous section are based on the assumption that 
both rent and discount rates remain at current values in all future periods. Here, we discuss the 
effects of relaxing these assumptions in a manner consistent with what we observe in the data. 
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 Amortization and Rent Changes 
 For the purpose of this study, we are primarily interested in the changes in the capital cost 
component of the rent since changes attributable to changing maintenance costs would not affect 
the analysis.17  The average annual increase in rent per square meter observed in our data is 1.3 
percent. Though this is in line with rent changes being driven by inflation in maintenance costs, 
one cannot discern from our data whether capital costs have changed. 
 To get a sense of the dynamics of the capital cost part of rents, we return to the annual 
statements from 125 cooperatives in Göteborg and record the amortization rate of their loans as 
well as the change in overall rents. We focus on the amortization rate since this should be the 
primary determinant of the capital costs of the cooperative in the long-run. The results are shown 
in Table 4. The average change in overall rent for the 125 cooperatives is 1.2 percent, which is 
very similar to that found in our original data set. As is seen from the percentiles of the rent 
changes, very few cooperatives lower their rents, although more than half keep their rents fixed 
for the year of the annual statement. The average amortization rate is 1.7 percent, although this 
may be somewhat misleading since the median rate is only 0.53 percent. The high average is 
driven by a few large amortizations, which were primarily the results of some windfall gain for 
the cooperative, such as the conversion and sale of previous rental apartments. These high 
amortization rates are therefore almost exclusively one time events and do not represent long 
term averages. The final row in the table gives the statistics for those cooperatives that amortized 
between 0 and 5 percent of their loans, and for which the average amortization rate is 0.71 
                                                 
17 Under the assumption of identical maintenance costs across cooperatives, an increase in this common cost would 
not affect our results. 
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percent. Based on a reading of the annual statements, we believe that this latter number gives a 
better estimate of the long-term average amortization rate. 
   Table 5 shows the results when an amortization rate of 1 percent is accounted for in the 
discount formula shown in equation (2); the discount formula is otherwise identical to that used 
previously. When all controls are included, the coefficient on future discounted rent equals -0.64. 
The corresponding result in Table 2, without amortization, is -0.45. If we instead set the 
amortization rate to 2 percent, the coefficient drops to -0.82; however, we feel that such a rate is 
unrealistically high given the evidence seen in the annual statements.  Accounting for 
amortization thus pulls the results some way towards market efficiency, but with a realistic 
discount rate of 1 percent, there is still a large discrepancy. 
 
Interest Rate Changes   
 The interest rate used in the discount formula obviously has a large effect on the present 
value of the discounted rent. The interest rate is fairly low during parts of the sample, particularly 
towards the end (3.6 percent during the last quarter); this is most likely well below what can be 
expected over the long-run. Thus, there might be some concern that our findings can be 
explained by expectations about interest rates increasing in the future, which would reduce the 
present value of future rent payments. 
 A first diagnostic of the validity of these concerns is to see if the rent coefficient changes 
dramatically over the sample period. If the evidence of market inefficiency is due to a failure to 
account for expectations about high future interest rates, we would expect the rent coefficient to 
be closer to efficiency at the beginning of the sample, where the interest rate is closer to a long-
run average. Estimating equation (3) quarter by quarter indicates that there is some small 
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variation in the rent coefficient; however, it does not appear to be in any way systematic over 
time. Thus, the results are not driven by lower discount rates at the end of the sample.18  
 Alternatively, we can estimate the implied interest rate for each quarter that is consistent 
with market efficiency. That is, we set θ  = –1, and treat the discount rate as the free parameter to 
be estimated. We still assume that a 30 percent tax-deduction is taken into account, but that there 
is no amortization. For each quarter, Figure 2 plots the actual five-year rate as well as two 
estimates of the implied interest rate. The first estimate shows the implied interest rate that would 
have to prevail in all future periods in order for market efficiency to hold. The second estimate is 
the implied rate necessary in all periods after the first five years, assuming that the current five-
year rate is used to discount during the initial five years. On average, the implied rate is about 3 
percent higher than the five-year mortgage rate in each quarter, and ranges from about 10 percent 
in the first quarter to 7 percent in the last. The implied interest rate when the current five-year 
rate is used for the first five years is substantially higher and varies between 16 and 10 percent.  
 Though five-year fixed rate loans are available, many home buyers still choose floating 
interest rates. It is therefore reasonable to assume that most of the uncertainty (and risk-aversion) 
regarding future interest rates is beyond the five-year horizon; that is, we can view the five-year 
rate as a conservative (i.e. high) expectation of rates for the first five years. Otherwise, the fixed 
rate loan would be more frequently used. Based on the implied interest rate beyond the five year 
horizon, it is clear that home buyers would have to have very risk-averse beliefs regarding the 
path of future interest rates in order to justify the lack of market efficiency found thus far. This 
would also be true if one allowed for amortization, although somewhat less extreme expectations 
are needed. 
                                                 
18 Though not presented here, these results are available from the author upon request. 
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 Future increases in the interest rate are likely to be associated with increases in the capital 
cost part of the rent, since this also reflects interest rate payments. Thus, future increases in the 
interest rate are likely to be more or less offset by increases in the rent, leaving the present value 
of future discounted rents fairly unchanged. Consequently, our analysis may be less sensitive to 
changing interest rates than it appears at first glance.19 
  
Capital Gains 
 The only parameter in the discount formula left to consider is the capital appreciation 
rate, πi. So far, we have assumed zero capital gains because πi reflects buyers’ expectations about 
the market in general and is hard to measure.  From the above discussion, it is quite clear that πi 
needs to be negative to get closer to market efficiency; that is, a price decrease would have to be 
expected. Since co-op prices increase substantially over the sample and the market can justly be 
characterized as booming, it does not seem likely that buyers would expect their homes to 
decrease in value. Case and Shiller (1988) find from survey data that home buyers in boom 
markets tend to believe that further price increases are likely, which implies that πi should 
actually be positive. Case and Shiller also document that most home buyers see their purchase as 
an investment and that the decision to buy was influenced by the possible capital gains.  Lastly, 
note that modest expectations of a 1 percent capital appreciation rate would cancel out the effects 
of the 1 percent amortization rate discussed above.  Expectations of larger capital gains would 
                                                 
19 Home buyers may of course base some of their decisions on worst-case scenarios. For instance, as indicated by a 
loan officer at Handelsbanken (a Swedish bank), most banks today require that borrowers can handle an interest rate 
of 7-8 percent in the future. This is not inconsistent with the implied interest rates necessary in all future periods 
estimated in the final quarters of our data.  Thus, one can raise these worst-case calculations as a potential 
explanation for our findings of market inefficiency.  However, a permanent shift to an 8 percent interest rate would 
also necessitate a higher capital cost component of the rent, which would once again more or less offset the 
increased discount rate. This leaves the worst-case scenario explanation of inefficiency somewhat unsatisfactory.  
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bring the rent coefficient even closer to zero than in the baseline specification reported in Table 
2. 
 
VII. Heterogeneity Across Parishes and Correlates of Efficiency 
 Thus far, our results indicate that, on average, co-op purchasers do not properly discount 
the annual rent.  It is possible, however, that the co-op market is more efficient in some 
subgroups of the population compared to others; that is, certain types of purchasers may be more 
likely to appropriately discount.   
 To try to get at these issues, we estimate equation (3) separately for each parish. Each 
regression includes the full set of controls, except for zip code fixed effects, and takes into 
account both a 30 percent tax deduction and a 1 percent amortization rate.  We present the results 
in Table 6; each row corresponds to a single parish and displays the discounted annual rent 
coefficient, standard error, and 95 percent confidence interval.  While there are 77 parishes in 
Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, we only present the results for those 70 parishes with 50 or 
more transactions in the sample.  Bolded rows indicate that the confidence interval contains -1.0.  
As seen in Table 6, the estimated rent coefficient is significantly different from -1.0 in 56 of the 
70 parishes.  In addition, the median estimate of the rent coefficient is -0.35.  There is also a fair 
amount of variation in the rent coefficient across parishes; the standard deviation of the estimates 
is 0.23.  
 What explains this variation in the estimated rent coefficient? Why do co-op purchasers 
in certain parishes behave in a relatively more sophisticated manner? For each parish, we 
obtained information about the age distribution, the amount of education, average income and 
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wealth as well as the income distribution.20  Table 7 groups the parishes into two samples, most 
and least efficient, and compares the above described variables.  The first four columns break the 
sample in half; that is, the most efficient parishes are those with rent coefficients below the 
median or closer to -1.0.  The last four columns look at parishes in the most and least efficient 
quartiles. 
Parishes which behave more efficiently have a significantly lower proportion of the 
population under the age of 19 and significantly higher proportion between the ages of 25 and 
44.  However, while these differences are significant, they are also relatively small and not 
economically significant.  The differences in the education and income variables across the two 
groups, however, are both statistically and economically significant.  On average, 16 percent 
more of the population has attended college in the relatively more efficient parishes; this 
education gap increases to 21 percent when comparing parishes in the top and bottom quartiles.  
In addition, average income and average wealth are significantly higher in the more efficient 
parishes; for instance, average net wealth, including the value of housing, is more than 200,000 
SEK greater.  This value doubles when looking at the top and bottom quartiles.   
Thus, Table 7 indicates that there are significant differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics between parishes that, on average, more accurately discount the rent. In general, 
these parishes are more educated and have greater wealth and income.  These findings line up 
well with one’s intuition regarding who would be the ‘sophisticated’ buyer. They are also in line 
with recent results by Campbell (2006), who analyzes household decisions regarding financial 
matters.  He finds that a minority of households make significant investment mistakes; this group 
tends to be poorer and less well educated than the majority of more successful investors. 
                                                 
20 We are grateful to Lennart Flood for performing all calculations involving these variables, which are sourced from 
the Swedish Linda dataset. 
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 An alternative explanation to this heterogeneity in the degree of market efficiency across 
parishes is liquidity constraints.  That is, if an initial down payment is needed, home buyers with 
less wealth may be forced to buy co-ops with lower prices and higher rents.  Though there is 
generally no set down payment required in Sweden, some mortgage lenders appear to 
recommend at least 5 percent. Although there is no way to directly test this hypothesis in our 
data, a simple example sheds some light on the potential role of liquidity constraints.  Consider 
again the example presented in the introduction; i.e. two identical 70 square meter apartments, 
one with a monthly rent of 2,000 SEK and the other with a rent of 3,500 SEK. In an efficient 
market, there should be a price difference of 360,000 SEK between these two apartments, if the 
effective discount rate is 5 percent, including amortization and capital gains. Thus, the difference 
in a 5 percent down payment would be 18,000 SEK.  The average sales price for a 70 square 
meter apartment in our sample is around 1.2 million SEK, which implies an annual mortgage 
payment of 42,000 SEK with a 5 percent interest rate and 30 percent tax deduction.  Therefore, 
the 18,000 SEK down payment difference seems relatively insignificant.  Given this fairly 
realistic example, it does not seem likely that liquidity constraints explain much of the variation 
in efficiency across parishes. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
We test for market efficiency in housing markets using a new and novel approach. We 
capitalize on the fact that only part of the true price of a co-op is captured by the actual sales 
price, with the rest paid through monthly rents that reflect the underlying debts of the 
cooperative. There is thus a simple present value relationship between co-op sales prices and 
rents. 
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Using hedonic price regressions, we find that, on average, higher rents are not fully 
compensated by lower prices. Under realistic assumptions regarding future interest and 
amortization rates, a 100 SEK increase in the discounted value of future rent payments only 
yields a 45 to 65 SEK reduction in the sales price. Overall, there is very strong evidence that 
home buyers do not fully take into account the costs of monthly rent payments when purchasing 
a co-op. 
Some quick calculations give an idea of the magnitude of the overall pricing error. 
Consider an apartment in a cooperative with loans of 5,000 SEK per square meter. This 
represents a capital cost of about 250 SEK per square meter per year and is close to the mean in 
the data if a maintenance cost of 350 SEK per square meter is assumed. If only about 50 percent 
of the capital cost is reflected in the sales price, the buyer of the co-op pays 2,500 SEK per 
square meter more than if the cooperative were debt free. With an average sales price around 
18,000 SEK per square meter, this represents a pricing error of about 14 percent, or 175,000 SEK 
on a 70 square meter co-op.  
Additional analyses show that the relationship between discounted rent payments and 
sales price is fairly heterogeneous across buyer groups.  An analysis of the socio-economic 
characteristics of potential buyers shows quite consistently that market prices are closer to 
efficient levels in areas with higher educated and generally better off people. These results also 
support the notion that housing markets may be less efficient than financial markets because of a 
lack of professional investors operating on the market; the higher educated home buyers would 
to some extent compensate for this and bring prices closer to efficiency. 
Given the strong evidence of an overall lack of efficiency in the market, are there any 
policy implications to be drawn? This does, of course, depend on the ultimate reason behind our 
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results. One possibility is that there is a lack of informed and sophisticated buyers on the market 
to push prices toward efficiency. Policy recommendations under this scenario would include 
more price transparency and a reform of the current realtor system. Currently in Sweden, there is 
just one real estate agent involved in the typical home-buying transaction. Though he is given the 
task to sell the home by the seller and his compensation is based on the sales price, he is also 
supposed to consider the interests of the buyer.  Debate regarding this conflict of interest and 
whether there should be separate representation of the buyer and seller is currently active in 
Sweden.  Such a reform, however, would only push prices towards efficiency if the real estate 
agents are themselves ‘sophisticated’ enough to determine prices that accurately reflect 
discounted rents. Given that our data come from transactions with realtors involved, this may not 
be the case; the college education for a realtor is only two years and a parallel debate is ongoing 
regarding the need to extend this.   
An alternative explanation of our findings is that for some at least partially behavioral 
reason, buyers prefer properties with lower sales prices and higher rents. For instance, the typical 
buyer may feel uneasy at the prospect of taking on a larger personal mortgage and be willing to 
pay a premium for the cooperative to hold some of the debt. Thus, if the prices of co-ops reflect 
such preferences, they may be the outcome of an efficient market process, albeit one based on 
what most economists would consider irrational preferences. Since it is generally less efficient 
for the cooperative to hold debt than for the individual members, who typically enjoy more 
advantageous tax deductions on their interest payments, this hypothesis is also supported by the 
existence of substantial amounts of debts in cooperatives. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Within Parish 
Std. Dev.(3) Min Max 
Price (kronor) 1,250,685 934,297 706,249 17,500 9,450,000 
Price per Meter2 19,903 11,436 5,120 179 86,667 
Annual Rent 
(kronor) 37,629 17,022 15,541 0 199,044 
PDV Annual Rent(1) 
(kronor) 1,150,926 562,249 520,712 0 4,335,367 
PDV Annual Rent(2) 
(kronor) 448,351 360,062 332,252 -3,046,353 3,037,637 
Meter2 65.78 27.19 25.39 12 276 
1 Room .18 .39 .37 0 1 
2 Rooms .42 .49 .48 0 1 
3 Rooms .25 .43 .42 0 1 
4 Rooms .11 .31 .31 0 1 
5 or More Rooms .037 .19 .19 0 1 
Floor 2.85 1.70 1.64 1 21 
Heat .73 .44 .43 0 1 
Stockholm .51 .50 .066 0 1 
Malmo .22 .42 .049 0 1 
Göteborg .26 .44 .058 0 1 
< 10 Years Old .052 .22 .21 0 1 
10-20 Years Old .061 .24 .23 0 1 
20-30 Years Old .049 .22 .19 0 1 
30-40 Years Old .076 .27 .23 0 1 
40-50 Years Old .094 .29 .26 0 1 
50-60 Years Old .29 .45 .42 0 1 
> 60 Years Old .38 .48 .38 0 1 
Discount Rate .048 .0086 .0085 .035 .070 
Note – 
(1) Discount rate takes 30 percent tax deduction into account. 
(2) Discount rate takes 30 percent tax deduction into account. A maintenance fee cost of 350 SEK per square 
meter is subtracted from annual rent. 
(3) Within standard deviation is the variation within parishes. There are 77 parishes in the sample and 
30,479 observations in total. 
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Table 2.  Regressions of Price on Discounted Annual Rent Using Transaction-Level Data       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PDV Annual Rent 0.38*** -0.36*** -0.75*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.45*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Meter2  4,362.39 13,467.47*** 27,583.36*** 27,557.57*** 26,967.22*** 27,192.93*** 26,013.42*** 
  (3,837.32) (3,905.26) (2,462.61) (2,481.60) (2,584.82) (2,574.62) (2,668.19) 
(Meter2)2  112.33*** 92.60*** 9.08 9.27 22.01* 21.64* 19.79* 
  (18.07) (18.19) (10.99) (10.95) (12.23) (12.22) (11.40) 
1 Room      258,792.00*** 254,672.13*** 224,213.08*** 
      (82,938.64) (83,065.69) (75,582.27) 
2 Room      305,499.74*** 301,666.55*** 263,668.30*** 
      (76,186.52) (76,152.56) (68,869.86) 
3 Room      277,257.43*** 275,030.51*** 239,327.18*** 
      (64,204.89) (64,124.79) (57,222.83) 
4 Room      194,080.77*** 193,016.63*** 174,636.12*** 
      (46,979.31) (46,924.41) (42,124.92) 
Floor       29,026.75*** 29,144.01*** 33,818.87*** 
      (4,682.00) (4,661.08) (4,514.96) 
Heat      -7,100.84 -5,958.86 -4,137.19 
      (8,183.16) (8,106.16) (6,149.28) 
10-20 Years Old      -233,931.56*** -231,713.27*** -133,862.87*** 
      (54,404.48) (54,445.04) (47,181.86) 
20-30 Years Old      -238,176.87*** -243,902.03*** -116,050.87** 
      (63,103.69) (63,130.18) (47,674.08) 
30-40 Years Old      -262,909.58*** -268,968.13*** -139,646.19*** 
      (57,196.42) (57,090.74) (44,372.72) 
40-50 Years Old      -183,283.52*** -191,050.45*** -83,386.02* 
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      (54,768.00) (54,791.71) (42,673.83) 
50-60 Years Old      -93,922.78 -99,498.78* -54,813.21 
      (57,795.31) (57,791.80) (42,161.50) 
>60 Years Old      -63,292.81 -69,103.18 -55,005.96 
      (62,192.28) (62,072.32) (50,272.26) 
Discount Rate       -12945134.34*** -10957551.33*** 
       (1,500,611.76) (1,338,701.59) 
Constant 818,268.44*** 808,918.39*** 231,229.83** 863,050.71*** 791,705.19*** 1,337,875.76*** 1,819,114.68*** 563,955.84** 
 (94,029.71) (104,325.77) (102,646.16) (126,314.53) (115,272.10) (184,023.63) (208,306.69) (228,557.45) 
Quarter Dummies NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parish Dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Parish Specific 
Trends 
NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Zip Dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 30479 30479 30479 30479 30479 30475 30475 30475 
R-squared 0.05 0.32 0.39 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.88 
Note – This table presents the results of regressing sales price on discounted annual rent when the discount factor takes the 30 percent tax deduction into account 
and assumes an annual amortization rate of zero. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish-level, are in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Omitted room category is 5 or more rooms and omitted age category is zero to ten years.   
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Table 3.  Regressions of Price on Discounted Annual Rent Using Quarterly Parish-level Data       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PDV Annual Rent -0.28*** 0.10 -1.13*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.60*** -0.62*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Controlling for:        
Size NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter Dummies NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Parish Dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Parish Specific Trends NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Apartment 
Characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Discount Rate NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005 
R-squared 0.02 0.40 0.50 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note – This table presents the results of regressing average quarterly price in a parish on average discounted annual rent.  Controls are listed at the bottom of the 
table and parallel those included in the transaction-level analysis. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  Observations are weighted by the number of transactions in the same parish and quarter.  The discount factor takes the 30 
percent tax deduction into account and assumes an amortization rate of zero. 
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Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics of Amortization and Annual Rent Changes in Sample of Göteborg 
Cooperatives  
 
    Percentile 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
% Change In Rent 125 1.24 8.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 7.00 
         
Amortization Rate (%) 125 1.70 7.82 0.00 0.00 0.53 1.67 7.27 
         
For Cooperatives with Amortization Rates Between 0 and 5%: 
Amortization Rate (%) 103 0.71 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.06 2.09 
         
Note –  Data in this table is based on annual statements for 125 cooperatives in Göteborg.  Almost all of the annual 
statements were from either 2004 or 2005.  
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Table 5.  Regressions of Price on Discounted Rent Using Transaction-Level Data When There is a 1 Percent Amortization Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PDV Annual Rent 0.50*** -0.61*** -1.03*** -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.73*** -0.64*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
         
Controlling for:         
Size NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter Dummies NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parish Dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Parish Specific 
Trends NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Apartment 
Characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Discount Rate NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Zip Dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 30479 30479 30479 30479 30479 30475 30475 30475 
R-squared 0.05 0.33 0.40 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.88 
Note – This table presents the results of regressing sales price on discounted annual rent when the discount factor takes the 30 percent tax deduction into account 
and adjusted for a 1 percent annual amortization rate. Controls are listed at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at the parish-level, are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.   
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Table 6.  Heterogeneity Across Parishes 
Parish 
Number 
Coefficient on 
PDV Annual Rent 
Robust Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval Observations R-squared 
p1 -0.78*** -0.19 -1.15 -0.41 68 0.96 
p2 -0.75*** -0.17 -1.08 -0.42 295 0.89 
p3 -0.13 -0.16 -0.44 0.18 227 0.91 
p4 -0.42*** -0.11 -0.64 -0.20 365 0.9 
p5 -0.44*** -0.07 -0.58 -0.30 984 0.9 
p6 -0.77*** -0.16 -1.08 -0.46 451 0.87 
p7 -0.59*** -0.15 -0.88 -0.30 299 0.92 
p8 -0.70*** -0.09 -0.88 -0.52 931 0.91 
p9 -0.91*** -0.06 -1.03 -0.79 500 0.86 
p10 -0.33*** -0.11 -0.55 -0.11 826 0.88 
p11 -0.48*** -0.08 -0.64 -0.32 832 0.87 
p12 -0.62*** -0.07 -0.76 -0.48 634 0.85 
p13 -0.47*** -0.11 -0.69 -0.25 865 0.91 
p14 -0.59*** -0.06 -0.71 -0.47 1403 0.89 
p15 -0.40*** -0.06 -0.52 -0.28 583 0.77 
p16 -0.72*** -0.07 -0.86 -0.58 491 0.69 
p17 -0.44*** -0.10 -0.64 -0.24 440 0.77 
p18 -1.15*** -0.04 -1.23 -1.07 900 0.78 
p19 -0.83*** -0.17 -1.16 -0.50 216 0.9 
p20 -0.94*** -0.14 -1.21 -0.67 517 0.8 
p21 -0.98*** -0.06 -1.10 -0.86 174 0.91 
p22 -0.65*** -0.05 -0.75 -0.55 810 0.77 
p23 -1.07*** -0.08 -1.23 -0.91 795 0.58 
p24 -0.13 -0.19 -0.50 0.24 194 0.76 
p25 -0.72*** -0.06 -0.84 -0.60 1092 0.76 
p26 -0.45*** -0.16 -0.76 -0.14 138 0.66 
p27 -0.82*** -0.15 -1.11 -0.53 258 0.76 
p28 0.15 -0.11 -0.07 0.37 415 0.54 
p29 -0.74*** -0.10 -0.94 -0.54 397 0.75 
p30 -0.18 -0.23 -0.63 0.27 490 0.79 
p31 -0.24*** -0.03 -0.30 -0.18 690 0.76 
p32 -0.57*** -0.06 -0.69 -0.45 458 0.81 
p33 -0.45*** -0.07 -0.59 -0.31 655 0.74 
p34 -0.40*** -0.05 -0.50 -0.30 1416 0.62 
p35 0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.28 302 0.8 
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p36 -0.25*** -0.04 -0.33 -0.17 638 0.75 
p37 -0.40*** -0.13 -0.65 -0.15 168 0.86 
p38 -0.58*** -0.10 -0.78 -0.38 216 0.77 
p39 -0.36*** -0.03 -0.42 -0.30 208 0.71 
p41 -0.68*** -0.07 -0.82 -0.54 687 0.72 
p42 -0.28*** -0.04 -0.36 -0.20 405 0.8 
p45 -0.63*** -0.09 -0.81 -0.45 511 0.79 
p46 -0.40*** -0.06 -0.52 -0.28 133 0.83 
p47 -0.24*** -0.07 -0.38 -0.10 101 0.83 
p48 -0.50*** -0.11 -0.72 -0.28 358 0.76 
p49 -0.87*** -0.09 -1.05 -0.69 412 0.87 
p50 -0.59*** -0.10 -0.79 -0.39 476 0.88 
p51 -0.50*** -0.09 -0.68 -0.32 488 0.8 
p52 -0.42*** -0.11 -0.64 -0.20 177 0.86 
p53 -0.62*** -0.08 -0.78 -0.46 617 0.82 
p54 -0.50*** -0.12 -0.74 -0.26 204 0.79 
p55 -0.55*** -0.05 -0.65 -0.45 439 0.8 
p56 -0.69*** -0.12 -0.93 -0.45 169 0.8 
p57 -0.58*** -0.11 -0.80 -0.36 318 0.84 
p58 -0.11 -0.07 -0.25 0.03 252 0.72 
p59 0.04 -0.08 -0.12 0.20 332 0.88 
p60 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.23 87 0.88 
p61 -0.06 -0.09 -0.24 0.12 395 0.77 
p62 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 216 0.85 
p63 -0.89** -0.35 -1.58 -0.20 52 0.84 
p64 -0.07 -0.14 -0.34 0.20 221 0.9 
p67 -0.86*** -0.26 -1.37 -0.35 110 0.8 
p69 -0.42*** -0.07 -0.56 -0.28 202 0.87 
p70 -0.33*** -0.05 -0.43 -0.23 366 0.85 
p71 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.17 81 0.73 
p72 -0.68*** -0.05 -0.78 -0.58 398 0.84 
p73 -0.30*** -0.04 -0.38 -0.22 229 0.76 
p74 0.10 -0.23 -0.35 0.55 184 0.87 
p75 -0.69*** -0.19 -1.06 -0.32 115 0.91 
p76 0.01 -0.09 -0.17 0.19 298 0.72 
Note – Each row presents the coefficient on the present discounted value of annual rent, taking into account a 30 
percent tax deduction and 1 percent amortization rate, when looking at each parish separately.  The full set of 
apartment characteristic controls, quarterly dummies, and interest rate are included in each specification. Parishes with 
less than 50 observations are omitted. Bolded rows indicate parishes for which the 95 percent confidence interval 
includes -1.0. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 7.  Comparison of Average Parish Characteristics for Parishes with More and Less Efficiency 
Outcome Variable 
Mean for Most 
Efficient 
Parishes (n=35)
Mean for 
Least 
Efficient 
Parishes 
(n=35) Difference
T-stat on 
Difference  
Mean for 
Most 
Efficient 
Parishes 
(n=18) 
Mean for 
Least 
Efficient 
Parishes 
(n=19) Difference
T-stat on 
Difference
% age < 19 0.28 0.32 -0.04 -2.52  0.30 0.33 -0.03 -1.33
% age 20-24 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.88  0.05 0.05 -0.01 -1.18 
% age 25-44 0.32 0.30 0.02 2.10  0.31 0.28 0.03 2.58 
% age 45-64 0.22 0.21 0.01 1.10  0.23 0.21 0.02 1.63 
% age >65 0.12 0.11 0.01 1.03  0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.74 
% grade school education 0.10 0.18 -0.08 -4.74  0.10 0.20 -0.10 -4.16 
% high school education 0.35 0.43 -0.08 -4.28  0.34 0.45 -0.11 -4.81 
% college education 0.55 0.39 0.16 4.93  0.56 0.35 0.21 4.89 
average gross labor income 185,698 149,956 35,742 3.57  202,843 138,011 64,832 5.03 
average net income 192,403 150,795 41,608 3.84  212,993 139,567 73,426 5.12 
average disposable income 179,439 158,903 20,536 3.10  194,519 152,633 41,886 4.81 
average net wealth 631,197 406,111 225,086 2.56  784,197 373,155 411,042 3.24 
average financial wealth 260,784 171,034 89,750 2.88  298,860 164,367 134,493 3.01 
% with income in bottom quartile 0.26 0.32 -0.06 -3.63  0.25 0.34 -0.09 -4.75 
% with income in middle two 0.45 0.47 -0.02 -1.42  0.43 0.48 -0.05 -2.49 
% with income in upper quartile 0.29 0.21 0.08 3.54  0.32 0.18 0.14 5.02 
Note – The first group of columns looks at average characteristics for parishes with the estimated rent coefficient above and below the median. The last four 
columns compare those parishes in the top and bottom quartiles. Rankings are based on coefficient estimates resulting from estimating the transaction-level 
specification with a 30 percent tax deduction and 1 percent amortization, as well as the full set of controls, separately for each parish. Coefficients are presented 
in the previous table.  Bolded test statistics indicate differences that are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Figure 1.  Average Quarterly Co-op Transaction Price and Discounted Annual Rent from 2002 to 
2005 
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Note – Discount rate takes into account a 30 percent tax deduction.  The capital component of the rent is 
determined by subtracting out a 350 SEK per square meter maintenance fee cost. 
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Figure 2.  Implied Quarterly Discount Rate versus Actual 5-Year Mortgage Rate.  
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Note – This figure presents the actual average discount rate for each quarter as well as two estimates of the discount rate necessary to achieve market efficiency. 
We estimate the implied measures from quarterly regressions that assume market efficiency (i.e. that set θ = -1) and treat the discount rate as the free parameter. 
The first estimate, labeled ‘Implied Discount Rate’, is the discount rate necessary in all future periods to achieve efficiency. The second estimate, labeled ‘Post 5 
Year Implied Discount Rate’, is the discount rate necessary in all periods after the first five years to achieve efficiency; we assume that the consumer discounts at 
the current 5-year fixed rate during the initial five years.  
